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Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori
Author(s) -
Cutter Brian
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12573
Subject(s) - a priori and a posteriori , proposition , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , aside , philosophy , philosophy of science , philosophy of mind , anthropocentrism , environmental ethics , linguistics , metaphysics , chemistry , biochemistry
This paper argues that nearly every proposition could in principle be known a priori , with exceptions for necessary falsehoods and a few other odd cases. The argument for this conclusion has two main premises: (i) Odd exceptions aside, if it is possible that p , then it is possible that someone knows innately that p . (ii) Necessarily, whatever is known innately is known a priori . After defending (i) and (ii), I conclude by suggesting that the best way to recover a reasonably limited and interesting conception of the a priori is to adopt an anthropocentric conception of a priori knowability, one that is relativized to our own innate cognitive capacities. However, this proposal has consequences that contradict prevailing views about the a priori . More importantly, this proposal has the result that many philosophical applications of the notion of apriority are misguided.