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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science
Author(s) -
Levy Ar,
Levy Yair
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12554
Subject(s) - morality , appeal , epistemology , natural selection , evolutionary theory , moral realism , realism , natural (archaeology) , evolutionary psychology , philosophy , selection (genetic algorithm) , computer science , political science , law , artificial intelligence , history , moral psychology , archaeology
Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put forward by two leading debunkers, namely Sharon Street and Richard Joyce. We raise a battery of considerations, both empirical and theoretical, that combine to cast doubt on the plausibility of both hypotheses. We also suggest that it is unlikely that there is in the vicinity a plausible alternative hypothesis suitable for the debunker's cause.