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Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis
Author(s) -
Schoenfield Miriam
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12490
Subject(s) - rationality , irrational number , value (mathematics) , core (optical fiber) , uniqueness , epistemology , positive economics , irrationality , ecological rationality , law and economics , philosophy , psychology , economics , computer science , social psychology , mathematics , telecommunications , geometry , machine learning
In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational credences to be more accurate than the irrational ones? My aim is to turn this challenge on its head and argue that, actually, those who deny permissivism will have a harder time responding to such a challenge than those who accept it.