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Why Take Both Boxes?
Author(s) -
Spencer Jack,
Wells Ian
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12466
Subject(s) - counterexample , premise , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , dominance (genetics) , philosophy , mathematical economics , value (mathematics) , mathematics , positive economics , economics , discrete mathematics , statistics , gene , biochemistry , chemistry
The crucial premise of the standard argument for two‐boxing in Newcomb's problem, a causal dominance principle, is false. We present some counterexamples. We then offer a metaethical explanation for why the counterexamples arise. Our explanation reveals a new and superior argument for two‐boxing, one that eschews the causal dominance principle in favor of a principle linking rational choice to guidance and actual value maximization.
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