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The Epistemology of Propaganda
Author(s) -
McKin Rachel
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12429
Subject(s) - citation , epistemology , sociology , philosophy , computer science , library science
Jason Stanley’s (2015) How Propaganda Works is an insightful contribution to a variety of fields and topics within philosophy. In this discussion note, I use Stanley’s account of propaganda to analyze a modern form of propaganda where so-called trans-exclusionary radical feminists (TERFs) are engaged in a political project to deny that trans women are women—and thereby to exclude trans women from women-only spaces, services, and protections. I will focus on two insights gained from this. First, Stanley’s account of propaganda usefully illuminates how the ‘arguments’ of TERFs constitute propaganda, crucially based on a flawed ideology. Second, it will allow me to expose some flaws that I see in Stanley’s account. Specifically, I will focus on objections I have to Stanley’s view of the primary epistemic concerns raised by propaganda. Stanley’s primary focus is on political propaganda, especially within a liberal democracy. Let’s set aside that narrowing of focus—on it’s face, I’m fine with that as a way to make a project manageable. Part of Stanley’s view is that, first, dominantly situated groups will tend to adopt false ideologies that justify their dominance. For example, his example is that the wealthy elite in a liberal democracy will tend to adopt the flawed ideology of merit. Second, the dominantly situated will deploy tools (implicitly or explicitly) such as propaganda in order to convince negatively privileged groups that they deserve their marginalization. As he writes, “By this route, the negatively privileged groups acquire the beliefs that justify the very structural features of their society that cause their oppression” (p.269). Stanley marshals various linguistic, psychological and “epistemological facts that make it plausible that such efforts will be successful” (p.269). To some extent I think that Stanley’s analysis is correct. When considering his example of the wealthy in liberal democracies such as the US, the wealthy are prone to acquire the flawed ideology that they deserve it; moreover, the wealthy will tend to enact tools (such as propaganda) that aim to have the economically disadvantaged believe that

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