Précis of The Phenomenal and the Representational

The Phenomenal and the Representational takes as its starting point two theses which are familiar from much recent work in the philosophy of perception. The first is that experience is transparent, in the sense that when one introspects, one ends up focusing on features which the experience presents as in one’s environment. The second is that one of the functions of perceptual experience is to make features of one’s environment available for thought. The guiding thought of the book is that, once made suitably precise, these two theses can show us quite a lot about the nature of the phenomenal and representational properties involved in perceptual experience. Part I introduces the phenomenal and representational properties which are the focus of the rest of the book. A central theme of the book is that when theorizing about the phenomenal and the representational, it is best to begin by focusing on the properties of subjects rather than (as is more commonly done) the properties of experiences themselves. We get our grip on phenomenal properties by thinking about what it is like to be a subject of experience; while thinking about properties of experiences may in some contexts be useful, the phenomenal properties of subjects are conceptually prior. Phenomenal properties are, to a first approximation, the determinates of the determinable property ‘being phenomenally conscious.’ Similarly, the relevant representational properties are properties of subjects of experience. They are properties of bearing a certain sort of representational relation — which I call a ‘sensing relation’ — to a content. I call these relational properties ‘sensing properties.’ 1