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In Defence of Radical Restrictionism
Author(s) -
Liggins David
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12391
Subject(s) - schema (genetic algorithms) , epistemology , philosophy , face (sociological concept) , philosophy of mind , law and economics , psychology , computer science , sociology , linguistics , metaphysics , machine learning
Restrictionism is a response to the Liar and other paradoxes concerning truth. Restrictionists—as I will call proponents of the strategy—respond to these paradoxes by giving up instances of the schema < p > is true iff p . My aim is to show that the current unpopularity of restrictionism is undeserved. I will argue that, whilst cautious versions of the strategy may face serious problems, a radical and previously overlooked version of restrictionism provides a strong and defensible response to the paradoxes.