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Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness
Author(s) -
Kriegel Uriah
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12327
Subject(s) - consciousness , electromagnetic theories of consciousness , epistemology , framing (construction) , philosophy , philosophy of mind , dual (grammatical number) , analytic philosophy , interpretation (philosophy) , psychology , contemporary philosophy , linguistics , metaphysics , history , archaeology
Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind (Thomasson [Thomasson, A.L., 2000], Caston 2002, Hossack 2002, 2006, Kriegel 2003a, 2003b, 2009, Thomas [Thomas, A.P., 2003], Smith [Smith, D.W., 2004], Zahavi 2004, Drummond 2006, Textor 2006, [Textor, M., 2013]). Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can be simultaneously thought of, or framed, equally accurately as (i) an awareness of a tree or (ii) an awareness of an awareness of a tree.