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Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets
Author(s) -
Gebharter Alexander
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12247
Subject(s) - causation , causal decision theory , causal model , bayes' theorem , causality (physics) , argument (complex analysis) , causal structure , supervenience , epistemology , mathematical economics , mathematics , computer science , bayesian probability , philosophy , artificial intelligence , metaphysics , statistics , business decision mapping , physics , biochemistry , chemistry , quantum mechanics , decision analysis , decision engineering
In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's ([Woodward, J., 2003]) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.