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How Narrow is Aristotle's Contemplative Ideal?
Author(s) -
Walker Matthew D.
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12194
Subject(s) - contemplation , worry , ideal (ethics) , philosophy , epistemology , diversity (politics) , human life , theology , environmental ethics , sociology , psychology , humanity , anthropology , anxiety , psychiatry
In Nicomachean Ethics X.7–8, Aristotle defends a striking view about the good for human beings. According to Aristotle, the single happiest way of life is organized around philosophical contemplation. According to the narrowness worry , however, Aristotle's contemplative ideal is unduly Procrustean, restrictive, inflexible, and oblivious of human diversity. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle has resources for responding to the narrowness worry, and that his contemplative ideal can take due account of human diversity.

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