Perceptual Constancies and Perceptual Modes of Presentation

§1. Mode of presentation Origins of Objectivity is an instant classic --a milestone in modern philosophy of mind. It masterfully integrates revelatory philosophical argumentation with detailed empirical case studies drawn from contemporary science. The centerpiece is a systematic account of perception, securely grounded in perceptual psychology, that should serve as a benchmark for future inquiry. Burge’s discussion also offers numerous striking insights into mental activity more generally. In this paper, though, I emphasize points of disagreement. I will criticize one relatively localized strand in Burge’s account, neglecting many appealing features of his overall approach. According to Burge, perception generates an analogue to Frege’s distinction between sense and reference: “the representational content that helps type-individuate perceptual states is not the particulars perceived. Nor is it the repeatable types that are attributed. It consists in modes of presentation as of particulars, and modes of presentation as of attributes that are perceptually attributed” (p. 385). 1 To develop his Fregean analysis, Burge introduces the notion of a perceptual attributive: “A perceptual attributive is an aspect of perceptual representational content that functions to indicate a repeatable type and to group or characterize purported particulars as being of that type” (p. 380). Different perceptual attributives can represent the same physical attribute. For example, different perceptual attributives can represent squareness. Burge motivates his Fregean viewpoint by citing various phenomena, including referential perceptual illusions (pp. 385-287), distinctions among sensory modalities (p. 40),