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The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing
Author(s) -
Tenenbaum Sergio
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12080
Subject(s) - consequentialism , value (mathematics) , citation , teleology , analytic philosophy , morality , philosophy , sociology , psychology , epistemology , library science , computer science , contemporary philosophy , machine learning
Portmore argues in Portmore (2011) that we can consequentialize any ethical theory; according to Portmore, any remotely plausible view is deontically equivalent to a consequentialist view. Let us assume for a moment that this is true. There are at least two ways to see the significance of this result. I’ll call the first interpretation the ‘dismissive consequentializer interpretation’. On this view, the the possibility of consequentializing any view shows that the debate between deontology and consequentialism is misconceived; there is no interesting difference between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism. On the other hand, the ‘earnest consequentializer’ takes these results as a vindication of consequentialism; in particular, these results supposedly show that we can have the intuitive appeal of consequentialism without having to bite bullets. Earnest consequentializers claim they can get all they want: theoretical satisfaction without carving organs for the greater overall good or letting one’s children suffer for the sake of a slight overall gain for strangers. Portmore is clearly on the side of the earnest consequentializer, and this is the view I wish to examine. Let us start by looking at three ways in which one can challenge the earnest consequentializer: