Premium
Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness
Author(s) -
Handfield Toby
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12050
Subject(s) - transitive relation , argument (complex analysis) , status quo , value (mathematics) , heuristics , skepticism , economics , mathematical economics , heuristic , epistemology , positive economics , philosophy , law and economics , computer science , mathematics , combinatorics , market economy , biochemistry , chemistry , operating system , machine learning
If A is better than B and B is better than C, then A is better than C, right? Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels say: No! Betterness is nontransitive, they claim. In this paper, I discuss the central type of argument advanced by Temkin and Rachels for this radical idea, and argue that, given this view very likely has sceptical implications for practical reason, we would do well to identify alternative responses. I propose one such response, which employs the idea that rational agents might regard some options as incommensurate in value, and will reasonably employ a heuristic of status quo maintenance to avoid suboptimal choices from incommensurate goods.