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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support
Author(s) -
Dogramaci Sinan,
Horowitz Sophie
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
philosophical issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.638
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1758-2237
pISSN - 1533-6077
DOI - 10.1111/phis.12078
Subject(s) - uniqueness , argument (complex analysis) , rationality , epistemology , focus (optics) , interpersonal communication , intrapersonal communication , value (mathematics) , philosophy , psychology , social psychology , mathematics , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , statistics , optics
White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument is that the best explanation of the value of promoting rationality is an explanation that entails uniqueness.