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EPISTEMIC ACTION, EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE, AND METACOGNITION
Author(s) -
Proust Joëlle
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
philosophical issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.638
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1758-2237
pISSN - 1533-6077
DOI - 10.1111/phis.12038
Subject(s) - enculturation , cognition , epistemology , action (physics) , complement (music) , process (computing) , psychology , metacognition , cognitive science , computer science , philosophy , pedagogy , biochemistry , physics , chemistry , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , complementation , gene , phenotype , operating system
How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive character of the agent, as a result of a process of enculturation. We argue that this view does not capture the role of sensitivity to epistemic norms in forming true beliefs. An analysis of epistemic actions, basic and extended, is proposed as offering an appropriate framework for crediting an agent with knowledge.