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WHY WE REASON THE WAY WE DO[Note 1. For discussion of material in this paper, thanks to ...]
Author(s) -
Shah Nishi
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
philosophical issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.638
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1758-2237
pISSN - 1533-6077
DOI - 10.1111/phis.12016
Subject(s) - citation , philosophy , epistemology , computer science , library science
Normal human adults have beliefs and intentions upon which they act. But other creatures have functionally similar states. Think of a cat stalking a mouse. It is quite natural to describe the cat as believing that the mouse is around the corner, having the goal of catching it, and racing around the corner in order to pounce on it. Unlike cats and other animals, though, we are not merely passive recipients of our beliefs and intentions; we are capable of reflectively governing them. We do not have this kind of governance over all of our mental states. Although we can reflect on the way things look to us (e.g. the stick in water looks bent), reflection alone is powerless to change our perceptions. They are what they are, whether we reflect on them or not. But normally when we reflect on our attitudes, we do not merely come to know what we in fact believe or intend; we determine what we shall believe or intend. This influence that reflection has over our attitudes is unmediated—we can normally determine what we believe or intend by reflection alone. However, only certain kinds of reflection have an unmediated influence over our attitudes. For example, when we reflectively conclude that it would be desirable to believe what we are already inclined to believe, our reflection alone will not issue in our believing it. 2 But when we reflectively conclude that our evidence confirms what we are already inclined to believe, our reflection alone normally will issue in our believing it. Even if you are inclined to believe that you will receive a promotion, for example, and even if you reflectively conclude that you will be happier if you believe that you will receive a promotion, you will not form that belief on that basis. But if you reflectively conclude that your evidence confirms that you will receive a promotion, then you normally will form that belief on that basis. There is of course a parallel here with intention. When we step back and try to