Premium
Wittgenstein’s Conception of Hypotheses in Chapters XII and XXII of ‘Philosophical Remarks’ and the Function of Language
Author(s) -
Franken Figueiredo Florian
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/phin.12293
Subject(s) - philosophy , epistemology , infinity , function (biology) , mathematics , evolutionary biology , biology , mathematical analysis
In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis as articulated in Chapters XII and XXII of ‘Philosophical Remarks’. First, I argue that in Chapter XII, Wittgenstein draws on his account of infinity to begin to challenge the view that all hypotheses can be proven by empirical evidence. I then argue that in Chapter XXII that Wittgenstein sharpens this conception of hypotheses claiming that no hypotheses can be verified. Finally, I suggest that Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis relates to his practical view of how language functions.