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Von Wright and Wittgenstein on (the Varieties of) Goodness and Family Resemblance: A Constructive Rejoinder to Klagge (2018)
Author(s) -
Jakola Lassi
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/phin.12250
Subject(s) - wright , goodness of fit , constructive , epistemology , philosophy , mathematics , art history , statistics , history , computer science , process (computing) , operating system
James C. Klagge (2018) readings of G. H. von Wright's and Wittgenstein's views concerning goodness and family resemblance are criticised and new interpretations are provided: Pace Klagge, (i) von Wright's arguments against goodness as a family‐resemblance concept do not concern cases of goodness but the interrelations between the conceptual varieties of goodness; (ii) Wittgenstein did not endorse a ‘constitutivist account of goodness’ in his 1933 lectures; and (iii) Wittgenstein did not come close to Stevenson's emotivism in his Philosophical Investigations . Rather, Wittgenstein's later remarks on goodness may be read as ‘objects of comparison’ (PI §130), implying no strong theoretical commitments.