Premium
Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of Assertion
Author(s) -
Tsohatzidis Savas L.
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/phin.12230
Subject(s) - assertion , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , philosophy , computer science , programming language , biochemistry , chemistry
Timothy Williamson has argued that, unless the speech act of assertion were supposed to be governed by his so‐called Knowledge Rule, one could not explain why sentences of the form ‘A and I do not know that A’ are unassertable. This paper advances three objections against that argument, of which the first two aim to show that, even assuming that Williamson's explanandum has been properly circumscribed, his explanation would not be correct, and the third aims to show that his explanandum has not been properly circumscribed.