Intuition, Foundationalism and Explanation – a Response to Mounce

Wittgenstein's scant remarks on the roots of language in instinctive behaviour have been both difficult to interpret and controversial, not least because they may seem to incline towards forms of explanation that elsewhere he eschewed. Nevertheless, they are of importance in philosophy, not least because they bear upon age‐old questions of foundationalism and concept‐formation. In a recent Discussion Note in this journal (Mounce, Philosophical Investigations , 2016, 39: 385–390), H. O. Mounce is not only attracted by but also champions such explanation – though he finds Wittgenstein's own “explanations” inadequate in important respects, as evidenced in his misguided criticisms of Moore in On Certainty and in his behaviouristic remarks on the roots of the “cause and effect” language‐game. In this response, I try to identify the philosophical roots of this attraction and the points at which Mounce's account departs from the elucidatory and non‐explanatory path established by Wittgenstein.