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Meaning, Use and Ostensive Definition in W ittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
Author(s) -
Cheung Leo K. C.
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/phin.12063
Subject(s) - ostensive definition , meaning (existential) , linguistics , class (philosophy) , word (group theory) , philosophy , epistemology
Abstract In this paper, I argue that the restricted claim in §43a of the Philosophical Investigations is that, for a large class of cases of word meanings , the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Although W ittgenstein does not provide any example of words having uses but no meaning as exceptions to the claim, he does hint at exceptions, which are names being defined, or explained, ostensively by pointing to their bearers, in §43b. Names in ostensive definitions, or explanations, are meaningful, but not being used, and are therefore exceptions to the claim that meaning is use.