Beyond H acker's W ittgenstein: Discussion of HACKER , P eter (2012) “ W ittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism” Philosophical Investigations 35:1, J anuary 2012, 1–17

In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” P eter H acker addresses what he takes to be misconceptions of W ittgenstein's philosophy with respect to (1) the periodisation of his thought and to what should properly be counted as part of his work; (2) his conception of grammar since the B ig T ypescript (1929–33); and (3) his conception of philosophy as grammatical investigation. I argue that Hacker's restrictive conception of what ought to be considered part of Wittgenstein's philosophy and his conservative view of Wittgensteinian grammar are unjustified and prevent him from appreciating the revolutionary importance of O n C ertainty for epistemology. Finally, while agreeing that W ittgenstein views philosophy as grammatical elucidation, I suggest some reasons for the resistance that this view has generated. In “Wittgenstein on Grammar, Theses and Dogmatism,” P eter H acker deals with three of the “many misunderstandings, misrepresentations and misinterpretations of W ittgenstein's philosophy” (2012, 1); the first of which concerns “the periodisation of W ittgenstein's thought”; the second, the supposition that what W ittgenstein called “grammar” in PI differed fundamentally from, and was more limited than, his conception of it when he was writing the B ig T ypescript ; and the third, the claim that what W ittgenstein took to be grammatical statements are, in fact, dogmatisms, theories or doctrines inconsistent with his meta‐philosophical remarks in PI . I address each of these concerns seriatim.