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Virtue beyond Reason
Author(s) -
Landrum Ty
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/phin.12010
Subject(s) - virtue , resentment , epistemology , philosophy , feeling , epistemic virtue , formative assessment , environmental ethics , sociology , law , political science , politics , pedagogy
In the wake of Aristotle, it is often thought that moral virtue is a matter of feeling and acting for the right reasons. This notion is not incorrect, but it obscures one of the most interesting dimensions of virtue. It overlooks the formative role that virtue can play in bringing forth the kinds of considerations that count as reasons. To illustrate this point, I discuss some instances of love and resentment that are not plausibly conceived as responses to reasons, but which exemplify virtue nonetheless. They do so, I argue, because they positively assert human worth.