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A restatement of expected comparative utility theory: A new theory of rational choice under risk
Author(s) -
Robert David
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
the philosophical forum
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.134
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1467-9191
pISSN - 0031-806X
DOI - 10.1111/phil.12299
Subject(s) - expected utility hypothesis , normative , decision theory , rank (graph theory) , subjective expected utility , mathematical economics , rational choice theory (criminology) , utility theory , economics , actuarial science , econometrics , mathematics , microeconomics , epistemology , political science , philosophy , law , combinatorics
In this paper, I argue for a new normative theory of rational choice under risk, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. I first show that for any choice option, a , and for any state of the world, G , the measure of the choiceworthiness of a in G is the comparative utility (CU) of a in G —that is, the difference in utility, in G , between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in G . On the basis of this principle, I then argue that for any agent, S , faced with any decision under risk, S should rank his or her decision options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their comparative expected comparative utility (CECU) and should choose whichever option carries the greatest CECU. For any option, a , a ’s CECU is the difference between its ECU and that of whichever alternative to a carries the greatest ECU, where a ’s ECU is a probability‐weighted sum of a ’s CUs across the various possible states of the world. I lastly demonstrate that in some ordinary decisions under risk, ECU theory delivers different verdicts from those of standard decision theory.