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When does self‐interest distort moral belief?
Author(s) -
Smyth Nicholas
Publication year - 2023
Publication title -
analytic philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2153-960X
pISSN - 2153-9596
DOI - 10.1111/phib.12261
Subject(s) - sort , epistemology , distortion (music) , power (physics) , psychology , moral disengagement , social psychology , philosophy , computer science , physics , amplifier , computer network , bandwidth (computing) , quantum mechanics , information retrieval
In this paper, I critically analyze the notion that self‐interest distorts moral belief‐formation. This belief is widely shared among modern moral epistemologists, and in this paper, I seek to undermine this near consensus. I then offer a principle which can help us to sort cases in which self‐interest distorts moral belief from cases in which it does not. As it turns out, we cannot determine whether such distortion has occurred from the armchair; rather, we must inquire into mechanisms of social power and advantage before declaring that some moral position is distorted by self‐interest.