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Dual carving and minimal rationalism
Author(s) -
Witmer D. Gene
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
analytic philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2153-960X
pISSN - 2153-9596
DOI - 10.1111/phib.12213
Subject(s) - physicalism , epistemology , philosophy , rationalism , argument (complex analysis) , metaphysics , reading (process) , carving , aside , consciousness , dual (grammatical number) , chemistry , linguistics , mechanical engineering , biochemistry , engineering
In his Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (2017), Philip Goff defends his anti‐physicalist argument against what he calls the "Dual Carving" objection—the idea that two representations of the very same fact could both be conceptually independent and "transparent," that is, revealing of the essences of the entities in question. His defense invokes a thesis he calls "Minimal Rationalism." I explore exactly how Minimal Rationalism is supposed to turn aside the objection and argue that the formulation of Minimal Rationalism on offer is ambiguous between stronger and weaker readings. Goff needs the stronger reading to use it in defense of his argument, but only the weaker reading is warranted by the considerations he brings to bear in favor of his rationalism. His "Minimal Rationalism" is, in sum, insufficiently minimal. The upshot is not only that Goff is deprived of a way of turning back an important objection to his case against physicalism; we also gain a better sense of what kind of rationalist thesis is properly invoked in metaphysics.