Lessons on Truth from Kant

Kant is known for having said relatively little about truth in Critique of Pure Reason (1781/7), and most commentators have followed suit. Many (including Bennett 1966; Strawson 1966; Wolff 1973; Hossenfelder 1978; Allison 1983; Guyer 1987; Longueness 1993; Gardner 1999; and others) have no entry for “truth” in their index, and others have only few references for this term. Nevertheless, there are important lessons to be learned from Kant about truth, lessons that apply to the contemporary debate on the nature and structure of truth and its theory. In this paper I would like to suggest two such lessons, one negative, the other positive. Both lessons concern the structure of a substantive theory of truth as contrasted with a deflationist theory; the second lesson concerns the correspondence theory of truth as well. In deriving these lessons I will largely focus on Kant’s first Critique, and in particular on its first half (up to the Transcendental Dialectic).