Precision, Not Confidence, Describes the Uncertainty of Perceptual Experience: Comment on John Morrison's “Perceptual Confidence”

Morrison puts forth a view he calls “perceptual confidence,” defined as “the view that perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence” (Morrison 2016). He contrasts this view with “postperceptual confidence,” which holds that degrees of confidence are assigned subsequent to perceptual experience. The question of the relation between perceptual experience and confidence is an important one, but the perceptual confidence view has a problem. Namely, degrees of confidence cannot be assigned to an experience; they can only be assigned to a decision outcome, and so cannot be a general attribute of perception. Perceptual uncertainty is not a new idea, but it is separate from and precedes determinations of confidence. Morrison’s approach, however, conflates uncertainty and confidence. Here, I raise concerns about the perceptual confidence view. I ask a series of questions about the scope of perceptual confidence, which I suggest is limited at best; discuss how Morrison’s construction of perceptual confidence conflicts with the scientific literature; and describe how sensory representations can underlie both uncertain perceptual experience and, only at a later stage, confidence. I propose that perceptual precision, not confidence, is a general approach for describing the uncertainty of perceptual experience.