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Existence and Number
Author(s) -
McDaniel Kris
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
analytic philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2153-960X
pISSN - 2153-9596
DOI - 10.1111/phib.12013
Subject(s) - citation , library science , computer science
The Frege-Russell view is that existence is a second-order property rather than a property of individuals. One of the most compelling arguments for this view is based on the premise that there is an especially close connection between existence and number. The most promising version of this argument is by C.J.F. Williams (1981, 1992). In what follows, I argue that this argument fails. I then defend an account according to which both predications of number and existence attribute properties to individuals.