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Partial aggregation in ethics
Author(s) -
Horton Joe
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
philosophy compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.973
H-Index - 25
ISSN - 1747-9991
DOI - 10.1111/phc3.12719
Subject(s) - face (sociological concept) , psychology , epistemology , social psychology , natural (archaeology) , sociology , philosophy , social science , history , archaeology
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer ‘yes’ and ‘no’, respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. These views contrast with fully aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is ‘yes’, and with non‐aggregative moral views, which imply that the answer to both questions is ‘no’. In this article, I review the most natural and influential ways of developing partially aggregative views and explain the main problems they face.