z-logo
Premium
Contrastivism and non‐contrastivism in scientific explanation
Author(s) -
Shan Yafeng
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
philosophy compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.973
H-Index - 25
ISSN - 1747-9991
DOI - 10.1111/phc3.12613
Subject(s) - compatibilism , epistemology , philosophy , scientific theory , free will
The nature of scientific explanation is controversial. Some maintain that all scientific explanations have to be contrastive in nature (contrastivism). However, others argue that no scientific explanation is genuinely contrastive (non‐contrastivism). In addition, a compatibilist view has been recently devloped. It is argued that the debate between contrastivism and non‐contrastivism is merely a linguistic dispute rather than a genuine disagreement on the nature of scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are both contrastive and non‐contrastive in some sense (compatibilism). This paper examines the debate between contrastivism and non‐contrastivism in scientific explanation. It begins with a critical review of the arguments for contrastivism, for non‐contrastivism, and for compatibilism and concludes with some remarks on the prospect of the issue.

This content is not available in your region!

Continue researching here.

Having issues? You can contact us here