Epistemic externalism in the philosophy of religion

Epistemic externalism is a view about what it takes for a belief to be epistemically justified or to be an item of knowledge. Externalism has grown considerably in popularity over the past few decades and this development has spilled over into the philosophy of religion, where we find externalist theories of justification and knowledge being employed to make the case for the positive epistemic status of religious beliefs. In §1, I offer an overview of epistemic externalism and its rival, internalism. In §2, I outline some of the most significant applications of externalism to the philosophy of religion. In §3, I consider whether externalist theories are really required to secure various desiderata that externalist religious epistemologists take to be important. In §4, I explore an objection according to which the facts of religious diversity indicate that religious beliefs do not meet externalist requirements for justification or knowledge. Finally, in §5, I consider a worry about whether externalist accounts can really be used to evaluate the epistemic standing of religious beliefs.