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Modal Semantics without Worlds[Note †. †I am indebted to Barbara Vetter for thorough and ...]
Author(s) -
Warmke Craig
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
philosophy compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.973
H-Index - 25
ISSN - 1747-9991
DOI - 10.1111/phc3.12356
Subject(s) - possible world , metaphysics , modal , epistemology , property (philosophy) , semantics (computer science) , formal semantics (linguistics) , modality (human–computer interaction) , philosophy , computer science , linguistics , artificial intelligence , programming language , chemistry , polymer chemistry
Over the last half century, possible worlds have bled into almost every area of philosophy. In the metaphysics of modality, for example, philosophers have used possible worlds almost exclusively to illuminate discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility. But recently, some have grown dissatisfied with possible worlds. Why are horses necessarily mammals? Because the property of being a horse bears a special relationship to the property of being a mammal, they say. Not because every horse is a mammal in every possible world. Some have recently begun to use properties to develop rivals to possible worlds semantics which may someday compare in formal power and capture the different systems of modal logic. In this paper, I do two things. I first offer a quick primer on possible worlds semantics. Then I discuss three rivals and the work they have left to do.