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Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism
Author(s) -
Vavova Katia
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
philosophy compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.973
H-Index - 25
ISSN - 1747-9991
DOI - 10.1111/phc3.12194
Subject(s) - skepticism , premise , epistemology , moral realism , realism , evolutionary theory , evolutionary neuroscience , philosophy , psychology , moral psychology , evolutionary ecology , biology , ecology , host (biology)
Evolutionary debunking arguments move from a premise about the influence of evolutionary forces on our moral beliefs to a skeptical conclusion about those beliefs. My primary aim is to clarify this empirically grounded epistemological challenge. I begin by distinguishing among importantly different sorts of epistemological attacks. I then demonstrate that instances of each appear in the literature under the ‘evolutionary debunking’ title. Distinguishing them clears up some confusions and helps us better understand the structure and potential of evolutionary debunking arguments.