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Moral Judgment and Deontology: Empirical Developments
Author(s) -
May Joshua
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
philosophy compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.973
H-Index - 25
ISSN - 1747-9991
DOI - 10.1111/phc3.12172
Subject(s) - deontological ethics , harm , principle of double effect , psychology , affect (linguistics) , social psychology , epistemology , consequentialism , doctrine , outcome (game theory) , moral dilemma , philosophy , law , political science , economics , communication , mathematical economics
A traditional idea is that moral judgment involves more than calculating the consequences of actions; it also requires an assessment of the agent's intentions, the act's nature, and whether the agent uses another person as a means to her ends. I survey experimental developments suggesting that ordinary people often tacitly reason in terms of such deontological rules. It's now unclear whether we should posit a traditional form of the doctrine of double effect. However, further research suggests that a range of non‐consequentialist factors influence moral judgment, including intentions, commissions, personal harm, and agent‐centered commitments. Many, if not all, such factors appear to affect how involved the agent is in bringing about an outcome.