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Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions
Author(s) -
Bongiorno Federico
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12373
Subject(s) - rationality , epistemology , fixation (population genetics) , psychology , delusion , social psychology , sociology , philosophy , psychiatry , population , demography
The Spinozan theory of belief fixation holds that mentally representing truth‐apt propositions leads to immediately believing them. In this paper, I explore how the theory fares as a defence of doxasticism about delusions (the view that they are beliefs). Doxasticism has been criticised on the grounds that delusions typically do not abide by rational standards that we expect beliefs to conform to. If belief fixation is Spinozan, I argue, these deviations from rationality are not just compatible with, but supportive of, their status as beliefs.