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Brandom's Leibniz
Author(s) -
Gartenberg Zachary Micah
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12335
Subject(s) - monad (category theory) , apperception , philosophy , perception , interpretation (philosophy) , epistemology , content (measure theory) , state (computer science) , function (biology) , linguistics , mathematics , pure mathematics , algorithm , mathematical analysis , evolutionary biology , biology , functor
Abstract I discuss an objection by Margaret Wilson against Robert Brandom's interpretation of Leibniz's account of perceptual distinctness. According to Brandom, Leibniz holds that (i) the relative distinctness of a perception is a function of its inferentially articulated content and (ii) apperception, or awareness, is explicable in terms of degrees of perceptual distinctness. Wilson alleges that Brandom confuses ‘external deducibility’ from a perceptual state of a monad to the existence of properties in the world, with ‘internally accessible content’ for the monad in that state. Drawing on Leibniz, I develop a response to Wilson on Brandom's behalf.