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Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority
Author(s) -
Piovarchy Adam
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12318
Subject(s) - blame , hypocrisy , normative , power (physics) , social psychology , psychology , law and economics , sociology , political science , law , physics , quantum mechanics
This paper identifies why hypocrites lack the standing to blame others for certain wrongs. By identifying problems with thinking of hypocritical blame as inappropriate and examining how the concept of standing is used in other contexts, I argue that we should think of standing to blame as a status that grants agents a normative power. Using Darwall's account of second‐personal obligations, I argue that hypocrites lack the standing to blame because they lack the authority to blame. Hypocrites lack this authority because they fail to accept other people's second‐personal authority to make similar demands on them.