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No Reasons to Believe the False
Author(s) -
Prado Javier González
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12271
Subject(s) - epistemology , false belief , philosophy , psychology , theory of mind , cognition , neuroscience
I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p , then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p . I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a generalized version of the view, which holds regardless of the agent's evidence. As a related result, I show that, given plausible assumptions, there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something false.