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Deferring to Others about One's Own Mind
Author(s) -
Doyle Casey
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12268
Subject(s) - pessimism , epistemology , point (geometry) , value (mathematics) , state (computer science) , self knowledge , psychology , philosophy , social psychology , sociology , computer science , geometry , mathematics , algorithm , machine learning
Pessimists about moral testimony hold that there is something suboptimal about forming moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates an analogous claim about self‐knowledge of the reason‐responsive attitudes. When it comes to your own mind, it seems important to know things “from the inside”, in the first‐personal way, rather than putting your trust in another. After motivating pessimism, the paper offers an explanation of its truth. First‐person knowledge is distinctive because it involves knowing a state of mind and finding it intelligible from one's point of view. It concludes by considering the value of this form of self‐understanding.