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The Realization of Qualia, Persons, and Artifacts
Author(s) -
White Ben
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12217
Subject(s) - qualia , physicalism , individuation , realization (probability) , possession (linguistics) , epistemology , supervenience , functionalism (philosophy of mind) , self realization , cognitive science , computer science , philosophy , consciousness , psychology , metaphysics , mathematics , linguistics , statistics , psychoanalysis
This article argues that standard causal and functionalist definitions of realization fail to account for the realization of entities that cannot be individuated in causal or functional terms. By modifying such definitions to require that realizers also logically suffice for any historical properties of the entities they realize, one can provide for the realization of entities whose resistance to causal/functional individuation stems from their possession of individuative historical properties. But if qualia cannot be causally or functionally individuated, then qualia can be physically realized only if the thesis that all things are physical or physically realized is insufficient for physicalism.