Defending Evidence‐Resistant Beliefs | Zendy

Viedge Nikolai | Zendy

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Defending Evidence‐Resistant Beliefs

Author(s) -

Viedge Nikolai

Publication year - 2018

Publication title -

pacific philosophical quarterly

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914

H-Index - 32

eISSN - 1468-0114

pISSN - 0279-0750

DOI - 10.1111/papq.12174

Subject(s) - feature (linguistics) , mental state , psychology , epistemology , resistance (ecology) , state (computer science) , social psychology , cognitive psychology , philosophy , computer science , ecology , linguistics , algorithm , biology

There is a view in the literature around beliefs that evidence responsiveness is a necessary feature of beliefs. The reasoning is that because beliefs are governed by truth they must be evidence responsive. A mental state that fails to be evidence responsive, therefore, could not be a belief as it could not be governed by truth. The implication is that even those evidence‐resistant mental states that appear to be beliefs are in fact something else. I argue that evidence resistance is a feature of at least some beliefs, so evidence responsiveness cannot be a necessary feature of belief.

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