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Explaining our Moral Reliability
Author(s) -
Dogramaci Sinan
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12153
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , premise , moral realism , reductio ad absurdum , epistemology , reliability (semiconductor) , psychology , philosophy , key (lock) , moral psychology , moral reasoning , social psychology , computer science , metaphysics , biochemistry , chemistry , power (physics) , physics , computer security , quantum mechanics
I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio : in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive reliability. Thus, the argument that would debunk our moral views would also, absurdly, debunk all inductive reasoning.