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Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said
Author(s) -
Peet Andrew
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12137
Subject(s) - testimonial , proposition , argument (complex analysis) , counterexample , relation (database) , epistemology , order (exchange) , psychology , computer science , philosophy , mathematics , advertising , biochemistry , chemistry , discrete mathematics , finance , database , economics , business
This article discusses the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the content of assertions in order to gain testimonial knowledge? There is a brief discussion of why this issue is of importance, followed by two counterexamples to the most intuitive answer: that in order for an audience to gain testimonial knowledge that p they must know that the speaker has asserted p . It is then suggested that the argument generalises and can be made to work on different sets of assumptions about the conditions for knowledge, and the conditions under which a proposition is asserted.