z-logo
Premium
Preface Writers are Consistent
Author(s) -
Clarke Roger
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12130
Subject(s) - doxastic logic , sketch , rationality , epistemology , point (geometry) , philosophy , computer science , mathematics , algorithm , geometry
The preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer's beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief – sensitivism – which allows such a solution. I sketch a sensitivist account of the preface writer's (consistent) doxastic state.

This content is not available in your region!

Continue researching here.

Having issues? You can contact us here