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Associative Virtues and Hume's Narrow Circle
Author(s) -
Frykholm Erin
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12122
Subject(s) - virtue , reading (process) , epistemology , philosophy , perspective (graphical) , associative property , obligation , character (mathematics) , computer science , law , linguistics , mathematics , artificial intelligence , geometry , political science , pure mathematics
This article offers a straightforward reading of Hume's ‘narrow circle’ – the boundary employed to define those with whom we sympathize in assessing an agent's moral character – that follows from a more careful look at his account of virtue. Hume employs a principle that can be understood as a virtue ethical equivalent of associative obligation, which thereby delimits the boundaries of this circle. This reading avoids concerns about unjustified partiality, moral blind spots, and demandingness, and shows a clear path for reaching uniform moral judgments; it also offers a new perspective on virtue of interest for contemporary virtue ethics.