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Aristotle on Choosing Virtuous Action for its Own Sake
Author(s) -
Luthra Yannig
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12078
Subject(s) - action (physics) , pleasure , nobility , virtuous circle and vicious circle , epistemology , beauty , philosophy , aesthetics , sociology , psychology , law , political science , economics , physics , quantum mechanics , neuroscience , politics , macroeconomics
While Aristotle claims that virtuous actions are choiceworthy for their own sakes, he also claims that many virtuous actions are to be chosen as instrumental means to securing further ends. It would seem that an action is choiceworthy for its own sake only if it would be choiceworthy whether or not it served further ends. How, then, can such virtuous actions be choiceworthy for their own sakes? This article criticizes John Ackrill's and Jennifer Whiting's answers to this question. I propose an alternative, linking the choiceworthiness of virtuous actions to the pleasure, nobility, and beauty to be found in them.