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Explaining Disagreement: A Problem for (Some) Hybrid Expressivists
Author(s) -
Eriksson John
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12052
Subject(s) - expressivism , sentence , meaning (existential) , subject (documents) , epistemology , psychology , philosophy , sociology , linguistics , social psychology , computer science , library science
Hybrid expressivists depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express beliefs and desires. D aniel B oisvert and M ichael R idge, two prominent defenders of hybrid views, also depart from pure expressivists by claiming that moral sentences express general attitudes rather than an attitude towards the subject of the sentence. This article argues that even if the shift to general attitudes helps solve some of the traditional problems associated with pure expressivism, a view like R idge's, according to which the descriptive meaning is speaker relative, turns out to have problems explaining moral disagreement.