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Normativity in Reasoning
Author(s) -
Broome John
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12050
Subject(s) - premise , proposition , normative , disposition , epistemology , sort , psychology , process (computing) , social psychology , philosophy , computer science , information retrieval , operating system
Reasoning is a process through which premise‐attitudes give rise to a conclusion‐attitude. When you reason actively you operate on the propositions that are the contents of your premise‐attitudes, following a rule, to derive a new proposition that is the content of your conclusion‐attitude. It may seem that, when you follow a rule, you must, at least implicitly, have the normative belief that you ought to comply with the rule, which guides you to comply. But I argue that to follow a rule is to manifest a particular sort of disposition, which can be interpreted as an intention. An intention is itself a guiding disposition. It can guide you to comply with a rule, and no normative belief is required.
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