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The If P , Ought P Problem
Author(s) -
Carr Jennifer
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
pacific philosophical quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.914
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1468-0114
pISSN - 0279-0750
DOI - 10.1111/papq.12048
Subject(s) - deontic logic , modality (human–computer interaction) , modal verb , generalization , semantics (computer science) , rank (graph theory) , epistemology , computer science , philosophy , linguistics , mathematics , artificial intelligence , combinatorics , programming language , verb
K ratzer semantics for modals and conditionals generates the prediction that sentences of the form if p, ought p are trivially true. As F rank and Z volenszky show, for certain flavors of modality, like deontic modality, this prediction is false. I explain some conservative solutions to the problem, and then argue that they are inadequate to account for puzzle cases involving self‐frustrating ought s. These cases illustrate a general problem: there are two forms of information‐sensitivity in deontic modals. Even generalizations of K ratzer semantics that predict these two roles for information, e.g. K olodny and M ac F arlane, predict that they vary together. I propose a generalization of K ratzer semantics that allows the two roles for information to vary independently of each other.

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